sanctioned any particular mental state—wherever there is wish, desire, or volition; and wherever there is none of these, *there* we hold there can be no moral action. There is nothing either moral or immoral in a mere intellectual act, or in a mere sensation, or a mere emotion, considered in themselves, hut whenever the will chooses these, gives its consent to them—there virtue or vice may exist.

Certain acts of the will, we are aware, are neither virtuous nor vicious. To prefer pleasure to pain, honour to disgrace, society to solitude; in such acts as these, whether they exist in the shape of wish, desire, or volition, there is nothing morally appro vable, or the opposite. The morality in the will begins at the place at which the law of God interposes, it it says, this pleasure is sinful—this honour can be attained only by unlawful means—this society is full of peril to the best interests of the soul; and if the pleasure, honour, and society are still preferred, the party is guilty of sin.

We are happy to find our views on this subject coinciding in the main with those of Dr. Chalmers. " We would now affirm," says he, " the all-important principle, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. We have often been struck with writers upon moral science, in that, even though professing a view or an argument altogether elementary, they seldom come formally or ostensibly forth with this principle/'7 " We think it for the advantage of our own subject that it should receive a different treatment; that it should be announced, and with somewhat of the pomp and circumstances, too, of a first principle, and have the distinction given to it, not of a tacit, but of a proclaimed axiom in moral science." He speaks of this principle as that " which binds together, as it were, the moral and the voluntary/'* It is an old theological maxim, *omne peccatwn est voluntariuru.* Doubtless some eminent divines denied it, but they did so, by

narrowing the meaning of voluntary, and confining it to acts done deliberately or with premeditation.

We maintain, then, that there can be neither virtue nor vice where there is no exercise of the will. There is nothing, for example, meritorious in the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties. Except in the motives by which he was swayed, Newton had no more merit in discovering the law of gravitation,

* Chalmers's Mor. Phil., chap. v.